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An underdeveloped country, such as India, serves as a
prime example of economic developmental theory - with all of its
complications and problems.

Agriculture holds the key position in

the total scheme of economic development - particularly in an
underdeveloped country.

For the agricultural sector, being the

predominant sector, must muster together all the elements of
development in order to care for the needs of its population and
at the same time generate development in the industrial sector.
It must be kept in mind that the key to development in India
will , in the long run, depend on the success of its industrial
development . This, in no way lessens the importance of the agricultural
sector.

For India is far from reaching her goal of becomi ng an

industrialized nation, at the present time.

This relationship

between agriculture and industrialization must be kept in proper
perspective.

Unfortunately, Indian planning officals have , in the

past, failed to see the correct relationship between the two.

Early

in the S econd Five - Year Plan , there was a sharp shift of interest
to industrial development at the sacrifice of the agricultural
sector .

This premature shift cost the Indian people dearly on their

road of development and they were forced by the reality of their
economic condition to return to the development of the agricultural
sector to its fullest extent in order to make the way ready for
Indian industrialization.
The economic problems of an underdeveloped nation differ
greatly from those of the more advanced nations of the world and
it is, many times, difficult to appreciate the issues and reasons
for the complexity of economic principles when applied to the
seemingly- simple underdeveloped countries.

2

It is very much easier to transplant
the fruits of economic development,
or at least go through the motions of
doing so, than to transplant the seeds.
It is fatally easy to transplant them,
not as end products but in isolation,
divorced from the process which has
created them in the industrialized
nations. Treated in such a fashion,
these fruits of economic development
have a way of putrefying and even
checking development itself. 1
Through an understanding of the vicious circles which the
economy of an underdeveloped country finds itself, realization of
the complexity of India ' s growth problem is more easily attained.
In an underdeveloped country we are faced with a system not only
of vicious circles, but of vicious circles within vicious circles.
There is the dominant vicious circle of low production.

An

underdeveloped country is poor because it has no industry; and has
no industry because it is poor.
A vicious circle between agriculture and industry appears.
There are two lines of industrialization which would be promising
to agriculture - (a) the manufacturing of goods that can serve as
incentive goods to farmers.

In reality, subsistence farming, lack

of division of labor, and premonetary arrangements prevail in underdeveloped countries due to the lack in supply of incentive goods.
(b) The production of agricultural tools and equipment suitable for
raising agricultural productivity .

However , low agricultural output

prevents the importation or domestic production of improved
equipment, and the lack of equipment prevents higher agricultural
2

output.
1

Hans vi . Singer , "Vicious Circles in Underdeveloped Economies,"
Economic Issues and Policies , ed . Arthur L. Grey , Jr. and John E.
Elliott , (Houghton Niffin Co., New York , 1961), p . 329 .
2

Ibid., p . 330.

3
Underdeveloped countries, with the modest resources at their
disposal and with a natural impatience for results, are under
constant temptation to skip the necessary external economies and
engage in premature projects which fail to attain their full
productivity for the lack of external economies, or else to sit
back hopelessly and do nothing.

3

Population poses an ominous barrier against economic develop ment.

It is likely that a nation who sustains development and

industrialization long enough will reach a point of a lowered birth
rate, which releases greater sources for investment .

However, it

seems that this stage is never reached in the underdeveloped nation
because the immediate effect of small improvements is such as to
throw the underdeveloped country back to its starting point in
population control.
Another important problem tncludes the political complexities
1'TYJich have a vicious circle all their own.

The desire for economic

development mayor may not arise from popular feelings and popular
pressures, but in underdevelo ed countries it is always the government that has to formulate the desire and translate the desire into
action.

This dependence of economic development on government

action has two signficant implications. (a) There is the problemof
government stability.

Underdeveloped nations need stability of

government far more than industrialized countries, where development
is automatic .

At the same time, the very lack of economic develop -

ment in many countries makes for instability of government. (b) The
soundest advice on economic development would generally be in the
direction of patience.

To proceed until enough resources for

sizable investment and for the creation of external economies can

3

Ibid . , p . 331.
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be accumulated. "To the peoples of underdeveloped countries, this
is highly unpalatable advice; to their governments, it is

The growing literature on economic development has recognized
the important place of agriculture in the underdeveloped countries.
It has been argued that economic development requires that a vast
number of people should shift out of agriculture.

If a vast

number of rural people shifts out of the a g ricultural sector of
the economy, then alternative sources of employment must be made
available in the non- agricultural sector.

This means that sUbstan-

tial industrialization is necessary if this agricultural population
is to find more productive non- agricultural employment .

This would

permit those who remain in agriculture to organize their farms in
more efficient, large - scale units.

According to the principle of

efficiency, resources should be transferred from employment in
which productivity is low to those in which it is high .
marginal transfere brings about an increas e in output.

~ uch

a

In a sit-

uation where labor is so maladjusted that its excessive application
in anyone line has brought its marginal physical productivity very
close to zero , the gain from shifts are:

(1) from increase in

productivity of men remaining in their former occupations since
the withdrawal of superfluous men may lead to organizational improvements and thus may make an increase in output per man hour
possible ;

(2) f r om gainful employment of formerly unproductive

workers if they are supplied with tools and raw materials with

4
Ibid . , p .

332- 333.

4

Q~cceptable.JI

5
which to work .

5

Taking a long period perspective , these conclusions

"are beyond cavil for any underdeveloped country.

But as guides

to the establishment of short- run planning goals these conclusions
6
are often misleading ."
In a closed economy where there is the absense of international
trade, one of the important pre - conditions of industrial expansion
is the achievement of an increase in agricultural productivity.
Rising agricultural productivity sustains industrial growth in
three important ways .

First, it allows agriculture to release part

of its labor force for industrial employment while at the same time
meeting the increasing food needs of the non- agricultural sector.
Second, it increases agricultural incomes.

This creates, on the

one hand, rural purchasing p01V'er needed to buy the new industrial
goods and, on the other hand, rural savings which may be mobilized
to finance industrial development.

Third , it enables agriculture

to supply the major wage goods to industrial workers at prices
favorable to the new industry.

7

In the open economy or in an economy which has access to
international trade, the contribution of rising productivity to
industrial development may not be as high as it was in the closed

5

S . K . Al'lasthi, "Agriculture and Economi c Development, "
Economic Affairs, (New Delhi, September, 1968), p. 217.

6
Ibid., p . 217 .

7

H. Arthur Lewis, TheorK of Ec onomic Growth , (George Allen
& Urwin, London, 1955), p. 33 •

6
economy.

Here the nation may find it more economical to import

some of its food needs.
Industrialization increases the demand for wage goods and
food is initially the most important wage good.

This results in

more favorable markets for agricultural products.

And this tends

to break down the stagnant subsistence of the agricultural sector.
There will be no incentive for producers of primary goods to
increase output by extension of cultivation, adoption of new
cultivation methods, introduction of new crops, unless they are
certain of an expanding market for their products .

Thus, as

higher incomes in the agricultural sector help to absorb finished
products of the non- agricultural sector, rise in income levels in
the industrial sector raises the demand for agricultural products.
Industrialization creates more productive non- agricultural employment
opportunities.
If farm labor is thus absorbed and if this
absorbtion proceeds far enough, increasing
labor scarCity in agriculture will raise
direct or imputed farm wages. Thus, those
who remain in agriculture must find ways of
raising the productivity so that they are
North these higher wages. In as much as the
agricultural sector in many underdeveloped
countries is incapable of generating sufficient
savings to bring about any improvement, it
find financial resources from outside. But
where agriculture is develpping in step with
industry, the flow of savings will be in
both directions. 8
Thus it is clear that rising agricultural productivity and
industrial development have much to contribute to one another.
But the problem of fixing priorities is a difficult one~

The

answer does not lie in balanced agricultural and industrial
development.

This is because of the fact that in an underdeveloped

country , the resources are severely limited.
8
Awasthi, p. 219.

Thus the application

7

of these limited resources in a balanced fashion may spread so
thin that they are below minimum levels for both sectors.

However,

some sense of balance is unavoidable in that lithe minimizing of
the waste of productive resources that results when one sector of
the economy acts for an unnecessarily long time as the e ffective
9
lirni ting factor (bottleneck) on the gr01IJth of other sectors." One
sP('tor of the economy can hold back another in either of two '1lays by failing to provide it with essential materials or services and
also by failing to provide a market for its product or service.
If industrial production expands while agricultural production
does not, the excess income of the industrial sector would exert
a pressure on the limited supply of the primary sector.
would result in the gene ration of inflationary pressures.

This
If

increases in agricultural production take place while the nonagricultural sector remains stagnant, the demand for agricultural
products will fall short of supply.

This would lead to a depression

in agricultural prices and a fall in incomes and this would also
hamper growth.
If balanced agricultural and industrial development cannot be
put into practice, it is therefore necessary to make a choice and
economists have fallen into two groups with regard to the prefereence
over the relative emphasis which agricultural investment should
rece1ve.

T . W. b chultz, Coale and Hoover, Khan , and Jacob Viner

9
Ansley J. Coale and Edgar M. Hoover, Population G~owth and
~conomic De velo ment in Low- Income Countries: A Case of India ' s
Prospective, (Princeton University Press, Princeton , 195 • p. 119 .

8
argue that efforts to increase food supply should receive hig hest
priority.

::' chultz comments: "In a hig h food grain economy where

most of the economic income of the community is represented by food,
there is little room except in agriculture for new and better
production possibilities, because the productive efforts required to
10
produce food are so large a part of the whole."
Coale and Hoover
argue that "very substantial progress in that most backwards part
of the (Indian) economy" (agriculture) is "a prerequisite to
successful development of the ••• economy as a whole" and that "if
one sector limits the growth of the other, it is more likely to be
a case of a gricultural growth limiting non- agricultural rather than
11

visa-versa."
~ conomists

like Higgins, Leibenstein, Albert Hirchman, K. K.

Kurihara recognize the need for raising agricultural productivity
but conclude that this can be accomplished only be g iving a "big - push"
industrialization program top priority.

Opposing the views of the

economists \'Tho stressed the the need for agricultural - dominated
development in underdeveloped countries at the International
Conference of e conomic Growth in Tokyo in April, 1967, Professor
Kunneth K. Kurihara pointed out that this would be an unwise
policy because of three considerations.

Firstly, the marg inal

productivity of capital in agriculture is lower than in industry.
Thus, it would be uneconomic to waste away the meager capital
resources by investing in agriculture.

Secondly , the propoensity

10
T. W. Schultz, The Dconomic OrganizatlaR af Agriculture,
(filcGraw-Hill, New York, 1963), p. 273 .
11

Coale and Hoover , pp. 120, 139.

9
to save in the agricultural sector is less than in the industrial
sector.

Thirdly, in so far as there is a tendency for the terms

of trade to move a gainst agricultural goods, concentration on the
development of agriculture would have an adverse effect on the
12
Therefore, a "balanced increase
country ' s balance of payments.
in agricultural output and industrial output is a luxury which an
advanced e conomy with abundant real capital can easily afford.
With limited savings and capital using projects competing for
these limitied savings , an underdeveloped economy would do well
to concentrate on the development of its industrial sector and to
1.3
let its agricultural sector develop by repercussions."
Excessive reliance on agriculture prevents underdeveloped
economies from quickly rais i ng the level of per capita incomes
because agriculture is not organized on a commercial basis, but it
i s treated as a way of life.

When there is a high percentage of

the labor force engaged in a griculture, this sector contributes
t he larges t share to the gross national product.

In consequence,

there is concnetration only in p r imary production of foodstuffs,
raw materials, and forest products.

The majority of people

depend upon the land for their livihood.

This gives ri se to

economic problems of land holding, land tenure, tenancy ri ghts which
need be to urgently solved if agriculture is to become a profitable
12
Awasthi, p. 220.
1.3
K.K. Kurihara, "The oretical Objections to Agricultural
Biased "'; conomic De velopment, I' Indian J ournal of ~ conomics, (New
De lhi, De cember, 1 958) , pp. 16.3 - 169.

10

occupation.
"The unit of ownership and the operational holding are the
two distinct entities which are fundamental to an understanding of
14
the land tenure problems in any agarian economy."
An uneven
distribution of land ownership merely aggrevates the problem, for
the growth of population without the proper siphoning off of the
surplus agricultural population makes the problem one of a permanent
nature.

"So long as land remains an economic opportunity for the

large owners having control over land use and marketing, so long
as the mounting population exerts itself to reduce the standard of
living which in turn gets capitalized into higher land values,
mere vesting of ownership rights to the operators would come to
nothings."

15

In any analysis of land tenure, three aspects emerge out of
the discussion - (1) overpopulation and its consequences; (2) the
operational holding; and (}) the uneven distribution of ownership.
Whate ver the definition of overpopulation , it is true that with
a growth rate of 2 percent and 80 percent of the gainfully occupied
population dependent on agriculture, a large scale underemployment
exists in rural India and a large portion of the rural population
can disappear without the slightest effect in national income.
The effect of overpopulation is thus felt in every level fro m the
landless laborers through the tenants to the landowners.

The over-

all effect is, however, a downward trend in the size of the holdings.

14
Salil Kumar Sanyal, "Some Topics Re lated to Land Tenure
Problems in India," Ec onomic Affairs, (New De lhi, October, 1968),
p. 225.

15
Ibid., p. 225.
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Since in India, large families are the rule , on account of the
working of inheritance laws, the holdings get subdivided and
fragmented.

This may lead to an e ffect in the cropp ing pattern

where it may be necessary to produce high income yielding crops per
unit of land even though national interests, market outlets and
16
other conditions may call for production of more extensive crops.
There is one striking feature of Indian land holding and that
is the ratio of working members to total members changes very
little over the different scales of household operational holdings.
Thic can be seen from the data of Table 1 :
PR8 C l~N'l'AGE OF \VORKING AND NOT WORKING l'lEllfB.t':RS BY SIZE OF
OPERATIONAL HOLDING , AGRICULTURAL YEAR 1960 - 1961.

1
2
.3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10
11

12
i)

14

size of house hold operational
holding (acres)
(1 )
up to 0 . 49
0.50- 0·99
1.00- 2.49
2.50- 4.99
5.00- 7 . 49
7.50- 9 . 99
10 . 00 - 12 . 49
12.50-1 4.99
15.00- 19.99
20.00- 24.99
25 . 00 - 29.99
.30.00- .39 . 99
50 . 00&above
all sizes

household size
(2)
2.71
4.59
4 . 77
5 . 27
5.85
6.1.3
6 . 54
6.70
6 . 91
7 . 40
7.24
7 . 94
8 . 75
5 . 20

HOUS~HOLD

Percentage of
working
not working
members
members
(4 )
(3)
56 . 1
4.3.9
4.3.1
56.9
4.3.8
56 • .3
4.3.1
56 . 9
4.3.8
56.2
44 . 0
56 . 0
4.3 . 6
56.4
4.3 . 6
56.4
45 . 1
54. 9
45.1
54.9
44.7
55 • .3
46.1
54 . 0
45.5
55·5
4.3.7
56 • .3

u ource : Land holding inquiry, 17th round , National Sample Survey,
b eptember, 1961 - July, 1962 .
A greater proportion of operated area , as seen in 'I'able 2,
1s taken on lease by the small cultivators, although a substantial
proportion of the total rented area is operated by large operational
16
Ibid. , p. 226.

12
holdings.

The system of r enting in against a share of produce

is the most prevalent practice and in small holdings is relatively
17
of greate r importance.
OF LEAS ~D I N AIlEA UND~R DIFFERENT 1'10D~::' OF TENANCY BY
OF OPERATIONAL HOLDING, AGRICULTURAL YEAR 1960 - 1961.
~ of leased in area reporting tenancy
percentage percentage
for
free on
for
of operated distribution for
holding
shar e
other
fixed fixed
of
s ize
area leased of leased
r ent terms
money produce of
in area
(acre s)
in
produce
(6)
(8)
(3)
(4)
( 7)
(5)
(1 )
(2)
4.6
6.8
31.6
17.2
39 . 8
.p to 0.99
2.3
19 .7
6.6
18.0
14.3
17.4
43.7
.00-2.49
8.3
15.9
6.2
13.8
14.2
14.0
18.3
47 . 5
16 . 3
. 50-4.99
4 .8
16.4
41.4
10.2
22.8
15.7
21. 7
.00-9.99
4 .8
22 . 3
14 .1
24 . 5
14.7
10.6
0.00-14.99
33 .7
11. 6
16 .5
14.0
32 .1
4 .7
8.8
35 .1
5.00- 24 . 99
6 .1
20 . 9
8.6
14.0
34 . 2
31.0
7.8
5.00-49.99
O.OOP·above
8.4
30.2
9.8
13 . 3
7.8
36 . 8
9.5
100 . 0
26 . 6
12.9
5.S
a ll sizes
10.7
38 . 7
17.5
P~RC"NTAG~

u IZ~

u ource: Land holdings inquiry, 17th round, National bample burvey,
number of sample villages: 3,486.
The above brings forward the problem of the ultimate unit of
operation in Indian agriculture .

If a parcel is defined as the ul-

timate unit of operation, the data on land holdings show that its
size is too small, 1.1 5 a cres on the average , less than one - fifth
of the holding ( 6 . 49 a cres ).
into extremely small parcels .

Even the large holdings are divided
This parcellizati on of holdings has

a connotation diffe r ent from the fragmentation of the units of
ownership.

Whi l e the latter is a result of the operation of the

inheritance laws by which the l and . is divided into smaller and
smaller units, the former is i ndicative of a subdivision of a farming
unit .

Large operators, the data show , have scattered small sized

parcels and not compact l a r ge p i eces of l and .

The exi stence of

seperat e pieces of land in a large holding only emphaizes the
17

Ibid., p . 228- 229.

13

complicated manner of tenurial relationships .

And the conse -

quences are an inefficient use of the soil which results in
considerable loss of cultivable aand used for roadways, and
fences, great difficulti es in water supply anc1 the use of submar18
ginal lRncl.
A""- the l a::1d holdinz

:'.pr:l'i:"~T

ShOHS, in Inclia there is "'n

meven d istri bution of o..med land, 12 percent of the rural households
did not have any land, 26 percent 01med belo<", 0.50 acres, 63.5
percent o"l'med below 5.0 acres.

On the other h2nd, 0.60 percent of

the ho seholds each owning 50 acres or more, owned 11 percent of
the total owned land.

Due to land r eform legislation, the extent

of landless households has decreased in many s tates, but even
now as much as 31 percent in Kerala and 24 percent in l"!adras do not
o.'m any land and the size distribution in many ::>tates has underg one
very little change.

19

These are some of the problems concerning land tenure. The
following conclusions emerge: (1) a large farm is not a large
fa.rm in India; (2) the pressure of population is great enough to
nullify any social objectives in the land reforms; (3) the nucleus
of large land owners still persists, the security of tenants
remains for most of the &tates illusive as the operational holding
is susceptable to frequent changes.
Jhile industrialization offers considerable benefits of
dynamic progress , it is essential to recognize the importance of
agriculture t o de ve l opment.

Industrialization depends on, the

surplus that can be tapped from agriculture .
18

Ibid ., p . 230 - 231 .

19

Ibi d ., p. 231.

horeover , agricultural

14and rural production can be rapidly raised with little capital
and a low order of mechanization.

There are possibilities of

doubling crop products, increasing the acreage through irrigation,
diversion dams, pumps and "Jells, the application of fertilizer
8,nd improved seed.

Underdeveloped agricultural laborers can be

used for construction of roads, houses and schools.

Large returns

in the agricultural sector are possible with relatively minor
changes in techniques which the Indian cultivators are willing to
make, given the suitable incentives.

Agriculture is also import-

ant to development because it has a bearing on the balance of
trade in a country such as India.

India ' s balance fluctuates

largely with changes in its food importation requirements. In
addition to this,

~ood

shortages get more quickly reflected in

price escalation in underdeveloped rather than in high income
countries.

This is because food is the most important Nage godd

",hich takes up to 60 percent of total concumption expenditure.
This results in the institutions of compulsory grain collection,
price control and rationing which are unfavorable for generating
development.

Jvluch higher returns can be expected from a well

organized program of raising agricultural output than from
controlling its distribution.
If the agricultural sector declines in importance, the
problem of capital accumulation will be rendered more difficult.
Anything which raises the productivity of the agricultural sector
will raise real wages in the industrial sector and since the
terms of trade generally go against the rural sector, capital
formation in the industrial sector keeps mounting.

Indeed, increased

rural net cash incomes serves as a stimulus to industrialization.
Thus, while agriculture is the dominant sector in an underdeveloped

15
nation, the economic agruments in favor of developing this sector
20
cannot be underestimated.
It is often stated that India 1s per acre yield of many
crops is among the lowest in the world, but this by iteself cannot
lead to the conclusion that Indian agricultural output can either
be increased rapidly with a few tecbnical innovations or that
it is inefficient.

"It is the opinion of some experts that, given

the present availability of factors of production and their prices,
Indian agricultural production is efficient; this contributes to
21
maki:ng cllimges so difficult.1l
Furthermore, there is evidence
that Indian peasant farmers are sensitive to price changes that
effect their output.

They respond to new cost- price relationships,

espeCially with regard to that portion of their output above
22
subsistance.
This raises the question as to whether present incentives in
Indian agriculture encourage both greater output of agri c ultural
products and an inc rease in their sale in exchange for manufactured
products.

One of the alternative policies on incentives in the

agricultural sector is essentially a policy to encourage those
indi vidual peasant farmers

~vi th

the resources and skills to take

advantage of new techniques and improved prices.

However, the

slowing of output over the past few years raises some questions as

20
H.F. Jussawalla, Economics of Development,
Publishing Co . , Bombay , 1969) , p . 68 .

(Oxford & Ibh

21
Rosen , George , Democracy and j!;conomic Change in India,
York, Random House, 1971), p. 187 - 188.

22 Ib~d
. ., p. 21 4 •

(New

16
to whether the incentives and the new technolog y possibilities that
were provided in the past decade are still sufficient to encourage
future growth.

2J

Highe r prices have not been used as an incentive to raise farm
output for the relationship between higher farm prices and agricultural
output is a

complex one.

Within India there has not been a

conscious a ttempt to use a change in farm prices to encourage farm
output.

At the same time, because of the poor farm output since

1961, farm prices have risen relative to other prices.

Be tween TiJ.arch

1961 and January 1965, the wholesale rice index of food articles
rose 40 percent compared with 9 percent for finished manufactured

24

g oods.

The effects of chang ing farm prices upon output will vary

depending upon the type of polivy adopted .

There is also evidence

that changes in the relationship between the prices of specific inputs
and the prices of the outputs they contribute to changes i the use
of these inputs - water, fertilizer, etc.
Howe ver, there is

8.

good (]pal of CJ.1)p.Rt ion ."i th respect to the

effect of changes in relative pricesof feTm products and nonagricultnC'al
prices as 8. whole .

Total farm output in India is still, i"1 lEtrge

part , dependent upon the monso on. Thus , c hanging price relationships
as a whole will have reatively minor effects upon total farm output .
At the same time , the risky character of Indian agriculture encourages
speculative withholding and fluctuating farm output prices can
encourage such withholding either in the hope of higher prices or by
improving the peasant ' s ability to hold off from selling.

2J

Ibid. , p . 215·

24
Ibid . , p . 215 ·

25

Ib i d . , p . 215 .

25

17
For these reasons, the use of price policy is skeptical.
In urban areas, such a rise in food p rices would lead to demands
for hig her wag es and hig her industrial costs.

That could have

both serious political repercussions in the urban areas and

possibly

harmful to India's competitive industrial position in international
markets.

The effects of such a price movement would also lead to

a s h ift in resources away from the industrial to the a g ricultural
sector.
This does not mean to say that an improvement in the
pricing mechanism would not be useful, for it could strengthen the
stability of the Indian economy.

Instability of farm prices probably

discourag es investment as a source of income.

If the government

were able to reduce risk by stabilizing prices, it would encourag e
farmers to g reater investment and increase in output.

S uch a

policy would also call for both widespread construction of public
grain warehouses and a willingness by the g overnment to buy its
26
stocks and sell them to stabilize prices.
Related to the problem of incentives is the question of
cooperative farming.

However, although voluntary cooperative

farming would appear to "be a useful institution, its introduction
in India has faced serious problems.

The cooperative farms which

the government has established have not been successful.

There

is serious doubt whether the peasant farmers could successfully
cooperate in light of the factionalism that pervades the village
and the lack of administrative skill necessary to run such a large
enterprise. Moreover, aside from the political and economic
questions there is evidence against the economy of scale theory
26
Ibid., p. 216.

18

27
often used in favor of cooperative farming.
In agricultural policy in the past, there
has been a stalemate between the voal and
influential advocates of cooperative farmand stronger land reforms, and the
landowners, aprty members and state officals
who are not vocal but are influential in
carrying out policy. The former are agalinst
incentives that would encourage the individual
peasant; the latter have not been strong
enough to prevent the adoption of past policy
statements or to fi ght for an alternative
national policy, but they have been strong
enough to prevent the stated pol icies from
being implemented . In effect the result is
conflict and no general policy. Instead policy
has been a mosaic of bits and piecesm such as
to discourage investment and greater output and
to lead to the present a gricultural stagnation . 28
An outstanding factor in Indian a gricultural policy is the
crucial level of the population.

This is a problem which is most

frustrating, especially to the economies of the underdeveloped
nations.

According to certain projections based on current high

birth and declining death rates, the population may well double
29
itself and reach 800 million by 1985.
During the last three decades,
the annual birth and death rates have fluctuated between 40- 45 and
26-36 per 1000, respectfully .

However, during the last fewyears,

the gene ral death rate and its components of Infant and Maternal
Mortality rates have gradually been declining, though the Infant
Mortality rate is still relatively high - 100 per 1000 live births in
a year .

27

Be tween 1951 - 1956 the death rate was 25 . 9 compared to less
Ibid., p. 222.

28
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Professor S . Chanrasekhar, "Population Growth and Econom;i.c
Development in India,1I Economic Issues: Readings and Cases , ed .
Campbell R. McConnell and Robert C. Bingham , (McGraw- Hill, New York,
1963), p . 263. *from S . Chandrasekhar, "Population Growth and
Economic Development in India , " Population Review, 1961, pp . 22 - 26 .

19
than 10.0 in the United s tates.

But the death rate is falling

and is expected to be at 12.5 by 1972.

30

HO\'lever, the birth rate

is not declining proportionately with the death rate.

Some of the

reasons for the high birth rate are - (1) nearly everyone above
the age of consent is actually married .
duty in India to ge t married.

It is a quasi-religious

As an individual's economic

security is seldom a prerequisite to marriage, and there is no
individual choice in one ' s selection of a wife or husband, there
is no economic or emotional deterrent to marriage.

(2) harriages

are at an early age. (3) There are increaing numbers of men who
are willing to marry eligible widows.
population problem.

'llhis is contributing to the

(4) There is the absense of any effective

and widespread family planning habit among the rural population
who constitutes some 80 percent of the total population.
ll'he crux of the problem facing Indian planners is how to
achieve higher levels of living standards and reduce the d.eath
rate, when the economy is unable to support the existing population
even at the present low level of living , if at the same time the
population continues to increase by about eight mi llion persons
every year?

In other words, as the draft of the Third Five - Year

Plan (1961 -1 966) sums up the situation :
In an economy with low levels of · income
and consumption, high rates of popUlation
growth severely limit the pace of economic
development. They increase the requirements
of consumption and the difficulty of providing
productive employment for the growing labor
force. If the long - term aims concerning
per capita income and the reduction in
the proportion of popul"~;.('ln ce'Tlend.ent on
93riculture are to .~ r~l:ized , the effort
by way of capital accumulation has to be
substantially increased. The objective of
stabilizing the population has cers.tinly
30

Ibid., p. 262.
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to be regarded as an essential
element in the srategy of
development.3 1
The population problem has serious consequences for Indian
development.

Firstly , this overpopulation has made it difficult

to erase the poverty and

IO~T

levels of living whi ch is experienced

by the majority of the Indian pe oples.

Secondly, India ' s population

is relatively young from the standpoint of age and composition and
it has inherent potentialities for increasing the annual additions
to the already high number of citizens.

The problem of rearing and

caring for a disproportionate large percentage of young people

~Tho

are not and cannot be gainfully employed, rests upon the relatively
small proportion of the gainfully employed.

This situation is bound

to lead to considerable economi c and social distress.
And lastly, a major objective of planned economic development
is to create full employment.

It is true that full employment is

also the product of such development.

But the present annual rate

of population growth , ranging between 1.8 and 2 . 0 percent, worsens
the employment, or rather the unemployment situation by stepping up
the number of entnmts to the labor force to the extent of something
nearing

15 million in the next five years.

It is unlikely that the

Indian economy Nill create a sufficient number of jobs to absorb
32
these additional numbers into he labor force.

31

Ibid., p . 263. ;<from National Planning Commission, Third
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Inevitably we are led to the only
possible solution - the establishment
of a socialist order, first within
national bourdaries ••• with a controlproduction and distribution of wealth
for the public good ••• (This) can
hardly take place without the willing
cons~at or acquiescence of the great
majority of the people concerned.
Is it desirable or possible for us
to stop the functioning of big-scale
machinery in our country? • • It is
obvious that Ne cannot do so. If
we have railways, bridges, transport
facilities, etc ., we must produce
them ourselves or depend on others.
If we want to have the means of
defense >,Ie must not only have the
basic industries but a highly
developed industrial system. No
country today is really independent
or resisting agression unless it is
industrially developed . The cooperative principle should be applied to
the exploitation of land by developing
collective and cooperative farms. It
was not proposed, h01'lever, to rule
out peasant farming in small holdings
•.. but no intermediaries of the type
of the talukdars , zamindars, etc.
should be recognized after the transition
period was over • •• Banks, insurance, etc .
should at least be under the control
of the s tate, thus leading to a state
regulation of capital and credit . It
was also desirable to control the
export and import trade.))
(The Plan) was inevitably leading us
to>'Iards establishing some of the
fundamentals of the socialist structure.
It was limiting the acquisitive factor
in society, removing many of the
barriers to growth, and thus leading to
a rapidly expanding social structure.
It was based on planning for the benefit
of the common man, raising his standards

))
Jawaharial Nehru, An Autobiography, (Bodley Head , London ,
195)), pp . 52), 526 .
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greatly , g~v~ng him opportunities
of growth, and releasing an enormous
amount of latent talent and capacity.
And all this was to be attempted in the
context of democraric freedom and with
a large measure of cooperation of some
at least of the groups who were normally
opposed to socialistic doctrine . That
cooperation seemed to me worthwhile
even if it involved toning do~m or
weakening the plan in some respects. 34
Policy makers in India describe their economic system as
democratic socialism, or development under demo cratic but centralized
control.

In this framework, they state, the criterion for deter-

mining economic policy is what is good for the community as a whole.
Although India calls herself a socialistic nation , the United
States is much more socialistic than India in terms of the
percentage of product spend by the g overnment and the go vernment 1s
overall direction of the economy.

35

The main goals of Indian planning include the following (1) to increase per capita income, primarily by raising total

output, (2) to place Indian growth on a self - sustaining basis is
no longer so heavily dependent on fluctuations in agricultuEal
output, which in turn depends so greatly on the vagaries of the
annual monsoon , to make the Indian economy and its development less
dependent on a fe\'J raw materials and traditional exports, which
are subject to world market price fluctuations; and yet, at the
same time, to make India eventually independent of foreign aid,

34
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Ltd . , London, 1956), pp. 405- 406.
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which would contribute in turn to its freedom in foreign policy
and its political independence, (4) in this process to provide
increased employment for the unemployed and underemployed, (5)
to diminish the inequalities in income and status among persons
and regions.

36

Economic planning has put several demands on Indian agri culture.

The success and failure of agricultural policy will

be based, in part , on meeting these demands .

First of all, it

must contribute to the political and economic democracy of the
37
nation .
In India, nationalism raises the horizons beyond
the family and. caste and province .

vIi th India being predominantly

a rural nation having three - forths of its population classified
as rural, regionalism and diverse tendencies are strong.

Thus,

the objective is to develop wide local participation in political
and economic processes .

But, for this to occur , it is necessary

to significantly develop the local governmental bodies .

Varying

social and economic conditions also requires a tailoring of
development efforts to meet local requirements and vitiates
centralized government .

38

It is i mpo rtant to note that progress

in this area has been slowed by a conflict between national
political philosophy favorable to development and the self - interest
of the

36

~o verni ng

bureaucracy.
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John \L Mellor, Devel opin~ Rural India, (Uni versi ty of
California Press , Berkeley , 1966 , p. 7.
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Indian agriculture must also provide employment for a growing population .

Expanding employment is a prime means of raising

per capita incomes for the amount of employment is i mportant in
40
determining the breadth of income distribution.
In the long
run, the Indian unemployment problem is more serious than the
shortage of food supplies.

Even though pressure on land resources

has increased, the rate of population growth has accelerated.
Moreover, the death rate will decline with India ' s success in
41
raising the availability of food and raising the living conditions .
The Indian agarian sector must also provide for the expanding
agricultural employment which will develop.

Within the context

of traditional agriculture with diminishing returns to increments
of labor and capital, the distribution of population with three fourths of the population found in the rural areas is, in the
42
short run, a major failure of Indian economic development.
The proportion between rural and urban population has stayed the
same over the first three five-year plans.

From 1949-50 to

1964-64, over one -half of the additional agricultural labor was
absorbed on increased a creage of irrigated and unirrigated land.
The remainder was absorbed by increased intensive farming which
brought about a r eturn of about 15 cents for each added day of
labor.

Major technical changes in Indian agriculture may increase

labor requirements as well as raise yields per acre.
40
Ibid. , p. 7.
41
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opportunity for absorbing a growing labor force is pro vided by the structure of modern agriculture including improved
roads, education, cooperative marketing and supplying organi43
zations.
Any policy oriented towards employment must als o
necessarily include efforts to increase agricultural production.
Likewise, there is a close relationship between employment44
oriented policy and food aid.
A rural public works program could play an important role
in increasing efficient rural employment .

The effective

implementation of a successful rural public works program has
four reuirements: (1) finanCing of labor force;

(2) complementary

physical resourees; (3) technical know-how; (4) administrative
structure.
Indian agriculture plays a key role in expanding the urban
employment sector.

Without a doubt , the major burden for providing

employment must fallon the uroan sector .

However, urban

employment requires vast inputs not only of direct inveestment
in production facilities, but also for investment in housing and
other urban necessities.
The three major sources

of capital for industrial development

are (1) foreign aid ; (2) foreign private investment; (3) and
domestic savings.

Aericulture

~ust

be a prime source of savings.

Thus it is agriculture which must pro v ide greater employment ,
either within itself or by providing capital to create nonfarm
jobs.

43
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44
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jobs.
The prices at which agricultural commodities are exchanged
for urban goods largely determine the rate of savings and investment in the urban sector.

Food prices are the most important

part of the cost of living for the working class, and they
determine the level of money wages.

If food prices are low as a

result of high agricultural production, money wages can be low;
consequently the level of profit will tend to be high, providing
a fund for savings and investment in industrial expansion.

During

the first year plans, agricultural prices fluctuated substantially,
but around a flat trend line.

Over this period, changes in the

relative price of agricultural commodities neither fostered nor
45
inhibited industrial development .
High taxes on agriculture can enable a government to

finance

the transfere of agricultural commodities to other sectors.
India has low taxes on agriculturists: during 1961 - 61 all taxes
on agriculturalists took less than 6 percent of agricultural
46
income.
The tax burden on the upper- income farmer (about 7
percent of income) is only slightly higher than the average tax
for agriculturists.

It is lower than the tax rate - about 18

percent of income - for people in the same bracket in non47
agricultural sectors.
For the upper income agriculturists , land
taxes comprise only about 20 percent of the tax burden and indirect
48
taxes make up the bulk of the remainder.
45
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Any across - the - board increase in the tax on the agricultural
sector will bear heavily on 10\'1er- income agricu 1 turists, and
for that reason will probably not be a.cceptable.
increa se in the

b u"" "~'"

Thus a major

'):" ",2 yeS or the agricultural sector

would almost certainly be associated with a reform of the tax
structure so that the burden is more fully borne by upperincome rural people.

49

With respect to direct taxation, there is little reason to
be lieve that the proportionate burden borne by agriculture has
increased over the past decade ; it has more likely decreased
since , of the main direct taxes, neither the land revenue payments,
which include payments formerly made to intermediaries in the
early years, nor the agricultural income tax have
stantia.l increase.

50

sho~m

sub-

The main direct tax on agriculture, the

land revenue tax, which has not been adjusted since the war,
declined from 4 . 5 percent of the net value of agricultural output
in 1938 - 39 to less than 2 percent of net agricultural output
in 1960- 61.

51

Although some states have agricultural income taxes, these
have many defects and their extension has not been advocated.
As a. result, Ashok J.Jitra concludes that in the 1950-58 period ,
while per capita agricultural income averaged about 40 percent
of nonagricultural income, the per capita tax paid by the
agricultural population was only about 12 percent of that paid
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by the nonagricultural sector .
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52

There have been many suggestions on how to raise the land
revenue payments of the peasants and to introduce an element of
progression into the system by

relati~~

th farm, but none have been adopted.

payments to the size of

In the budget proposals

of the years 1963-64, the central government proposed a compulsory
deposit scheme under which those peasants paying land revenue
would be required to deposit with the government offices a sum
equal to 50 percent of the land revenue they paid in 1959-60, or
half of the average land revenue of Rs 3 per acre .

The proceeds

of this compulsory deposit would have gone to the states.

However,

this indirect proposal to tap a major potential source of
additional revenue was withdrawn after protests from the states.
This withdrawal is an indication of the power of the peasat
groups in both the state and national Congress parties.

53

With a tax policy that results in
taxes lagging behind expenditures
in the agricultural sector , there
has been a steady flow of resources
through the government from the
nonagricultural to the agricultural
sectors. Under such circumstances
it is not surprising that the shift
in the structure of the Indian
economy from agricultur to nonagriculture has been l~gging behind
both hopes and plans. 5
Providing an increasing quantity of food is another important
'-,-lit

demand placed on the Indian economy.

Inc reasing the productivity

per capita of its population constitutes the basic task of
the Indian economy .

52
53
54

Ibid. , p. 147.
Ibid. , po 147.
Ibid. , p.

1L~9 •

There are two related reasons why ,it is

29
sensible for India to place particular emphasis on raising
incomes through increased agricultural production.

First, rapid

gro th in the demand for food creates a favorable economic
environment for expanding agricultural production.

Equally

important, India has a natural resource base in agriculture
which provides clear potential for raid increase in production
and high rates of return to the necessry investment.

55

The argument against agricultural development is that over
a period of time, the prices of agricultural commodities will
tend downward in relation to nonagricultural commodities, thus
favoring production of industrial products.
assumption.

This is a silly

The Indian demand for agricultural commodities

is potentially so great that the inability of India to meet the
bulk of its agricultural production needs through domestic
production would eventually raise world agricultural prices.

56

Although in the past, population has been the prime factor
in growth of demand for food, rising per capita incomes are
playing an increasingly significant role.

The importance of

income in determining demand for food suggests that the agricultural
sector will continue to playa strong and positive rolw in
Indian development even if a solution is found to the population
problem.

57

Indeed, slower population growth will increase the

per capita demand for food, since one of the prime effects of a
decrease in the rate of population growth will be to increase

55
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per capita income.

Higher income will also sharply increase

the demand for food.

Gro ..tth in per capita income also increases

the demand for what might be termed luxury commodities, such
as livestock products, fruits, and ve getables , much more than
it increases the demand for grain .
Rising incomes increase the demand most for commodities
such as milk, eggs , ve getables and fruits that provide a large
value of output per acre of land and require a large labor
input.

These commodities are particularly ..tell sui ted to the

resources available to Indian agriculture.

Despite this potential,

however, the Indian economy has apparently been less effective
in increasing production of these commodities than of the
basic food grains , and the prices of milk , vegetables, and
similar products have consequently risen much more then prices
of food grains.

58
~mall

changes in prices for these commodities

cause substantial shifts in consumption.

The price differences

indicate a major failure in meeting demand.

This failure c is

probably due to a lack of concern for agriculture, to the les se r
aggregate importanc

p

of these

co~odities ~no

the lpck of political

pressure from risin£, prices, and to the particularly difficult
problems of marketing and producing many of these commodities.

59

As a result, a major potential of contribution to income generation ha.s not been used.

~olving

the production and marketing

problems for such commodities will become more important as
rising per capita income increases the proportion of the total
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demand for food that is compr i sed by demand for these commodities.
To asurprising extent, increased agricultural production
in India creates its own demand.

This tendency can be reinforced

if increased agricultural production encourages greater employment of low income laborers .

Thus, increased employment and

better welfare would maintain upward pressure on food prices . As
a consequence, agricul tural success "\Irould appear to be a failure;
there would be continuing political and economic pressures for
food aid , even though Indian agricultural production were increasing
rapidly .

A program of steady achievement in agricultural develop -

Irlent will not end either the pressures on India I s agriculture or
the need
60
India.

fo~ c continued
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development and contribution from rural

INDIAN PLANNING THE THREE FIVE - YEAR PLANS

}2
Through the first three plan periods, Indian agriculture
succeeded in meeting roughly the growth in demand for food and
in absorbing about three-fourths of the growth in demand for
food and in having absorbed labor only at declining levels of
productivity, hence lowering real income, and in contributing
nothing to the formation of jobs in the nonagricultural sector.
As a result a failure to increase productivity and to contribute
to increasing incomes in the economy, agriculture did not contribute to a more equitable distr ibution of income, particularly
61
with reference to the landless laborer.
The success of Indian agriculture was achieved largely
without the benefit of major technological change.

Prior to

1961, the production increase resulted from expansion of the
total land area and of the area under irrigation , and from
increased labor.

New crop varieties, new agronomic practices,

and inorganic fertilizers played a modest role during this
period .

The faster rates of growth upon which other objectives

of development depend can only be achieved through technological
change.

With better technology production may be increased at

the same time that incomes and returns to factors of production

62

are increased.
There are four prerequisites to technologi cal change in
agriculture: (1) an incentive system that encourages acceptance
of innovation; (2) a set of improved production processes created
for local conditions; (}) an educational system to teach farmers
,

how to choose and adapt technology to specific conditions; (4)
61
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efficient supply to farmers of the added inputs in which
technological change is embodied.

63

India has controlled its economic development by means of
a series of five - year plans that began in 1951.

The device was

borrowed from the Soviet Union by the late Prime Minister
Jawaharial Nehru who hoped to achieve for India an, economic
growth similar to that of the USS R.

Each plan stipulates a

series of investment and production targets .

Industrial expansion

is stressed and agriculture and manpower are given low priority.
This relative emphasis reflects an early view of economic growth
that held as a nation progressively raises its industrial
investment, a point is reached where grwoth becomes "pervasive
64
and self - sustaining."
The Indian planners concede that low
productivity, the high proportion of the population in agriculture
and large - scale unemployment are deterrents to growth.

They

believe, however, that these factors will be responsive to a
policy designed to raise investment to about 17 percent of the
national income .

65

In the First Five - Year Plan, the government 1s objective
was to raise the living standards of the Indian people.
planning document states:
The central objective of planning
in India at the present stage is
to initiate a process of develop ment which will raise living standards and open up to the people new
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opportunities for a r~cher
and more varied life. 6
The First Five - Year Plan (1951 - 1956) was no plan at all.
It recognized the prime necessity of continuing to consolidate
the nation into a political whole, of beginning to build an
economic as well as political democracy by turning attention to
social- welfare objectives, and of beginning to expand the income
base. lilt emphasized what ''las the easiest to emphasize and did
67
what was easiest to do."
The deficiencies of the plan - how
little of value economics had to contribute about the processes
of building an economy from a base like that of India - was not
evident at the time.

"The Planning Commission embarked upon a

program of planned and facilitated development long before

68

planning tools and underlying knowledge ",ere at hand."
The characteristics of the First Five - Year Plan were as
fol101'<8 - (1) it assumed that landowners, moneylenders, and traders
iOn agricultural commodities severely exploited agriculturalists;
(2) it assumed that agriculturalists were basically ignorant
people who continued to farm in a backward and unproductive
manner; (3) although it recognized that agricultural production
was also dependent on inputs, and that among these, water was
particularly important ; there ",as little understanding of the
69
role of technological change or of its conditions .
Remedies to
the problem of exploitation lay in land reform and abolition and
provision of alternative means of marketing agricultural commodities.
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Government of India Planning Commission, The First Five - Year
Plan , Vol . 1 , (New Delhi, December , 1952) .
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To

alleviate backwardness, carrying of information concerning

improved methods to farmers , programs of social welfare to gain
the confidence of cultivators, and literacy programs to

increase

the level of education.
The problem of inputs was attacked through major investment
in irrigati on facilities which made up 16 percent of the first
70
plan expenditure.
IH th India I s shortage of administrative and
organizational manpower, plus lack of basic knowledge both of
the agr icul tural sector and how it should be developed. large - scale
71
multi - purpose irrigation projects seemed the most sensible choice .
The Community Development Program was the most ambitious
and exciting feature of the First Five - Year Plan .

It was not

oriented purely towards developing agricultural production.

Its

basic design was intended to change the attitudes and outlook of
the rural population .

H01"leVer , much of the decisions regarding the

Community Development Program vvere based on an incorrect appraisal
of village attitudes and the prerequistes of agricultural
72
development .
It offered literacy classes, better supply of
drinking water, community centers , cooperative organizations .
youth programs, improved roads , new local governmental bodies .
and better seeds , tools . and farming practices.
73
123.000 villages and 80 million persons .
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The program reached
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The basic unit of the Community Development Program was
the Community Development Block (100 villages and 60,000 to
70,000 persons) .

It coordinated an administration which treated

the needs of village development.

The Block Development Officer

directed the hierarchy of technical specialists and villagelevel workers.
trator.

In practice, however , he "I',as a general adminis -

The Technical Specialists "rere heavily burdened with

administrative chores.

Their time was spent more with facilitat-

ing loans and subsidy assistance than extending technical
knowledge.

The function of the village-level worker was to set

up field demonstrations, to iniate talks and group discussions,
to investigate villagers ' needs, to awaken concern, and to
carry out programs developed by the technical specialists.

They

lacked formal education and knowledge necessary to understand
new technology and the degree of respect they generated from the
villagers varied from village to village.

74

The structure of the Community Development Program created
the tendency for administrative structure to form a line
organization which unfortunately further isolated the higher
order of competence in the Community Block from the farmer.
concept of the Block and village - level worker were clearly
"vi sionary ."
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'I'here was a general tendency to operate the

Community Development Program as an entity, seperate from the
rest of the state ' s program in agriculture.

One of the few

soldis bodies of technical competence, the British system of
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district agricultural officers , was seperated from the major
76
rural development effort.
In theory, each state ! s development commissioner appointed
Block administrative staffs and the village - level workers and
was also expected to coordinate Block activities with the state ! s
technical departments.

The district collector, the key admin-

istrative head at the district level, was responsible for
corrdinating all activities in the district, including the
CDP Blocks .

In practice such coordination did not extend far,

and the Blcocks operated mostly as seperate structures.

77

The Blocks were generally isolated from sources of technical
advice .

There was no clear tie with agricultural experiment

stations .

There was further complication by the procedures for

promoting Block personnel.
distant administrators .

Promotions were gained by impressing

The bureaucratization of the system

and the time spent in routine administration and report- iITiting
cannot be stressed too much .

Also frequent traasfere of personnel
78
made it difficult to discover the villagers ! needs and desires.
Criticism of the Community Development Program include the
following - (1) did not place enough emphasis on increasing
agricultural production ; (2) expanded too rapidly at the expense
of quality; (3) it was divorced from research and from the old
agricultural extension program , thereby losing contact with the
district agricultural officers and with the technical competence
that did exist ; (4) the administrative structure was such that the
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government gave orders to be filtered out to farmers through
a complex bureaucracy which received little influence or guidance
from the farmers themselves.

79

Valid criticism of Indian

agricultural developmental planning in the First plan period
focuses not s o much on the a lloca tion of Community Deve lopment
resources as on the failure to see what was missing and to build
a base for supplying those missing elements.

No effort was

made to expand agricultural research or to increase technical
competence or extension a gents.

The action programs were probable

consistent with the needs and resources of the moment , but the
total plan did not confront the necessity of changing the
environment in order to facilitate quite different programming
80
in the future .
It is easy to argue the failure of the Community Development
Program but it is difficult to formulate a better alternative
for the India of 1951.

The massive effort encouraged a constant

concern and attention for the rural sector which would otherwise
have been absent in a government

d~minated

by intellectuals

concerned much more with industrial than with rural development .
Likewise , the application of a widespread administrative structure
to rural problems generated pressures for reform and for development
81
of a much useful institutional framework.
I r rigation played an important part in the First Plan period.
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~xpanded

irrigation facilities accounted for more than

one -

fifth of the real or weather - adjusted production increase of
the First Plan period.

The growth of population and the

consequent pressure to move into marginal lands have expanded
the land acreage , and have thereby proved to be more important
factors in increasing agricultural production than has investment
in irrigation .
Irrigation received major emphasis in the First Plan because
water plays such an important role in Indian agriculture and
because the types of administrative and capital resources required

82
for irrigation were abundant at the time the First Flan was framed.
The natural desire of farmers to reduce the risk and the traditionally low price of irrigation water provided an obvious basis for
India to emphasize irrigation in the First Plan .

This was

reinforced by the suitability of large - scale irrigation projects
to an economy which has large sources of unskilled labor, an
exceedingly short supply of industrial capital, and a scarcity
of administrative resources for planning and executing industrial
83
plants or complex agricultural schemes.
An additional factor
which supported the adoption of large - scale projects in the First
Plan was the need for tangible monuments of achievement in the
neN nation.

Bhakra Dam, 740 feet hip:h, dramatized the pm-fer of
84
the ne\,T government .
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Irrigation has been an imuortant contribution to increasing
Indian agricultural production because of the heavy expenditures
made for it, and not because these expenditures were efficiently
used, for they afforded a high rate of return.

The rate of return

to irr igation has gene rally been small in both physical and
monetary terms.

The investment in irrigation should make a 10

to 20 percent return and increase production 2 to 3 fold, actually
it has afforded a 4 percent r eturn i'lith 50 percent increase in
production .

Hi gh rates of return depend on the development of

research and other institutions which \<rere ineffective at the time
of the First Plan.

85

Returns to irrigation were often lm'J"ered

further because new facilities could not be used to full capacity
by farmers which had not prepared their field channels .

Inadequate

preparation of the land is also a difficulty, for itf the fields
are not level, there is poor distribution of ''later and full
bebefit from irrigati on is lost.

As a result farmers have often

found "rater use and conservation unprofitable, either due to

lac''.~

of complementary crops, fertilizer, and farming practices or because
poor distribution systems provided so much water per field that

86

the returns to the final increments of water were very low .
I'.ajor criticisms of the Indian irrigation policy - (1) too
much attention has been given to famine relief and not to intensive
development of agriculture; (2) total investment in irrip:ation he.s
been insufficient ; (3) management of irrigation systems has been

85
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poor, resulting in part from the division of authority between
the Ministry of Food and Agriculture and the Hinistry of Irrigation
and Power;

(4) irrigation development (particularly in regard to

new facilities) has not been corrdinated with increased input
of fertilizer and exte Lsion s e r vices ; (5) there has not been
enough research for irrigation.

87

The problem of removing exploitation from the agricultural
sector was also tackled under the First Five Year Plan.

In

discussing the success and/or failure of policy under this
program it is necessary to determine three things - to what extent
does exploitation actually oocur; to what extent of any exploitation which did occur actually affected agricultural production;
and to what extent ,..ere goverflJO.ent policies effec ti ve.
At the time of independence, the zamindari and the yrotwari
were the two dominant systems of land tenure .
generally described as a

peas~t - proprietor

The latter is

or small - holder system;

the former was in essence a feudal landlord- tenant system.

One of

the prime policies of the All - India Congress was to eliminate
intermediaries between the cultivator and the g overnment.

After

independence , a major and largely successful effort was made to
implement this policy , and the , Feport of the 1948 Agarian Re form
Committee of the Congress established a basis for subsequent
legislation .

Reform legislation attempted to eliminate all

intermediaries including the zamindars , and to protect by suitable
regulation the tenants who might remain .
The whole problem of land- tenure reform has been greatly
complicated in India not only by the multiplicity of systems
existing at the same time, but also by the provision that land -
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tenure legislation was to be left to the states.

Zamindari

abolition hoped that it would be accomplished (a) under the
new constitution, which protected property rights (b) with
compensation to the former zamindars and (c) with ample protection
for the right of the zamindars themselves to resume personal

88
cultivation on land previously let to tenants.
In regard to regulation of tenancy , Indian land reform has
been much less successful.

The basic reason lies in the fact that

since land is so important in making a living, the landowner
necessarily has great power over the tenant .

When there is no

alternative for a tenant, he can be prevented from even appealing
to the protection of the law.

Huch renting tends to be IIsub-

89
rosa" and short - termed, hence difficult to regulate .
According to Indian economist Ali Khusro ,

75

percent of

Indian agriculture is now based on essentially peasant systems.
Under these systems the land is divided into holdings of a size
which provides, under existing technology , a full - time job for
the farm family.

The family suppl i es the labor, makes the basi c

decisions , and reaps the primary benefits .

The remaining 25

90
percent of land is still under various systems of tenure .
A full appraisal of Indian land reform must take into
consideration (a) the extent of one man l s arbitrary power over
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another (b) the efficiency and level of agricultural production
(c) the distribution of income (d) the distribution of political
p01ver .

The zamindari system gave the zamindars great power over

their tenants .

\O[ith such a large amount of illiterate tenants,

abolition has allowed new exploiters to enter the vacuum.

Also,

from a base of greater than average economic pOler and education ,
the zamindari landowners continue to dominate most political
positions.
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From the teoretical side, lithe First Five - Year Plan 1vas,
essentially a collection of several projections and contained a
Harrod - Domar type exercise which sought to examine growth rates
that would be achieved by specification of feasible marginal
92
savings rate and a resulting average savings ratio. 1I
The model
was not given an explicit analytical form, but was implicit in
numerical figures which constituted a perspective plan for
developing the Indian econom .
of the Harrod - Domar model.

It was essentiaaly a simple variant

The sole modification, but a crucial

one nevertheless, was the distinction bet.Jeen average and
marginal propensities to save.

93

The canital- output ratio was

assumed the same on the margin as well as on the average.
The model 1-Jas essentially developed for a closed economy
1'1i th the followin.a: basic equations underlyinp: growth -

(1) I

(2)

u

t

91

aY

u

t

t

- b
t

(4) I

K

t

t

Ibid . , p . 54 .

92

Ja~dish N. Bha,o:wati and uukhamoy Chakravarty, Contributions
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I

- investment at "t"
t

s

- corresponding amount of savings
t

Y

- income

t

All equations except (2) are the same as the Harrod - Domar mode l.
Equat ion (2) introduces the distinction between marginal and awpraee
propensities to save .
equation K

act K

t

t

The model leads to the basic differential
b which can be solved to give a time

profile of capital stock and output:
a

(5)

b/a ~ )e

(K

K

o

t

t ck
+ b/a ""

Unlike the harrod - Domar model , growth rises from period to pe riod
(provided a ..., ::; / Y ).
o
0

An economy saving more on the marg in than

on the average can do better over time in terms of the rate of
growt h .
This model is useful in indicating t he basic macro - economic
features that a more elaborate system would equally satisify.

It

serves as a simple mechanism for computing exte rnal assis tance that
may be necessary for supplementing domes tic savings to sustain the
projected rate in income .
The Harrod-Domar model, however, obscures some problems of
importance .

Concentration of the flo,'! equilibrium and implicit

assumptions that there are no structural difficulties in trans formin~

savings into investment may i gnore the real constraints

in the economy .

With the frame work of assumptions, the model

ignores the fundamental choice of planning over time which
reQuires a weighing of present versus future gains by assumi ng

4.5
a constant marginal propensity to save for the economy as a
94
whole .
It appears that the selection of
projects by governmental expenditure
reflected essentially the 1I0verheadCapital ll approach to developmental
planning and the model was largely an
intellectual appendage "lith little
imoact on actual formation of the
First Five - Year Plan . 9.5
The ;:;econd Five - Year Plan (19.56-1961) "las essentially a
continuation of the agricultural program carried out under the
First Plan .

It was not until late in the Second Plan that planners

began to ask serious questions about agricultural development .
The program was organized with the Community Jevelopment Program
expanded to country-wide coverage.
minor irrigation schemes.

Hore attention was given to

Concern about the exploitation of farmers

continued \'lith more attention given to circumventing moneylenders
and traders by cooperatives and regulation.
cooperati ve farming reflected

The emphasis on

the increased concern \,li th the

farm structure as the abolition of intermediaries ''las believed not
96
to have solved the land tenure problems adequately.
Any discussion of the Second Five - Year Plan falls into two
parts: (a) policies and programs v,hich '-1ere logical outgrowths of
the First Plan - (1) moneylenders and credit cooperatives; (2)
traders and service cooperatives; (3) farm structure including
cooperatives and consolidation; (4) development of panchayats;
and (b) rising criticism of agricultural developmental planning
"lhich has provided a basis for the experimentation of the Third
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Plano
At the beginning of the First Plan it was recognized that
an adequate solution to the credit problem had not been found
and the All- India Rural Credit S urvey

~'ias

initiated in 1951.

The

report of the survey was issued in 1954 and showed that credit
societies had not provided widespread alternatives to the moneylenders and it formed the basis for future
the credit field .

positive efforts in

97

In moneylending, the problem was poorly diagnosed.

1m

general, the peasant cultivators responsible for the bulk of
production were not in the grasp of the moneylenders and were
not held back from production by lack of credit.

The literature

of protest against the moneylenders was not based on fact, for
those exploited represented a small minority of the poorest and
economically weakest in the society .

Loans to these groups were

basically consumer loans required to maintain a low standard of
livi~.

~he

basic problem was not exploitation by moneylenders,

98
that Nas a symptom, the problem was poverty.
I'.oreover , the moneylender sys tem seems quite eff icient.
~here

appears to be relatively free entry into moneylending

and this keeps rates in line with costs .
l i mits abuses.

Thus , competition

99

The cooperative credit programs failed initially because they
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had stepped into a situation where there was competition among
efficient private operators who possessed great knowledge of the
community and who operated in a highly flexible manner.

The

bureaucratic governmental agency was poorly suited for handling
consumer credit to the economically poorest groups who are least
likely to repay.

Lending for purposes of increased production and

providing increased income to facilitate repayment are the
areas where the cooperatives have the greatest advantage.

To

be able to compete in making such loans, cooperatives must become
more flexible in timing and terms of the loan and they must minimize bureaucratic red tape .

Another important requirement is

the provision of sound possibilities for profitable investment
in new technology.

The relative growth in importance of cooperative
100
credit has been associated with improving technology.
If trading and service cooperatives are to be successful
under existing conditions, they must be highly efficient and
preferably should offer additional services.

In general, marketing

and supply cooperatives have not been successful in India .

Not

only have they attemped to compete in situations where the
average margins are thin, but also they have been hampered by
bureaucracy which has lessened their efficiency and flexibility .
Rather than render better service , thay have all too often rendered
worse.

There are, however, some outstanding exceptions including

the Kaira District Milk Cooperative, a number of sugar, oilseed ,
and cotton- making cooperatives.
100
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Successful cooperatives' operate
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outside the governmental bureaucracy, enjoy first-class administrative imagination and leadership, and have offered special
101
s erv ices.
The key to providing services which farmers desire is
efficient management and sufficient decentralization of authority
to allow the management to use its skills and abilities.

Once

good training programs are established, local boards of directors
or advisors should be set up for two purposes: (1) to advise
cooperative managers of local problems and provide background
knowledge; and (2) to provide a basis for local responsibility.
Far too little progress has been made in recognizing the problem
of competing with private trade, of training competent management,
102
and of shifting real authority to the local level.
Concerning land tenure and farm structure, the Se cond Plan
asserts that tiThe main task during the plan is to take such
essential steps as will provide sound foundations for the development
of cooperative farmin~ so that over

a period

of ten years or so

a substantial proportion of agriculural lands are ?ultivated on
103
The problem lies in that there have never
cooperative lines."
been guidelines for and effective administrative action aimed at
spreading cooperative farming.
There is a credible case for expecting economies to accrue
from consolidation of Indian farms.
101
102
103

Ibid . . p . 67 .

Ibid ., p . 69 .
Ibid., p. 71.

Average Indian farms consist
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of five acres or so.

Most agricultural production in India

takes place on farms which make relative use of the family
labor force, at least at seasonal peaks.
no basis for greater efficieny.

Joint farming offers

There are propects for efficiency

from farmers with small holdings .

The common error in appraising

the question of scale is to confuse it with the man- land ratio .
Pooling both the land and the family labor forces of many farmers
cannot add significantly to the amount of land per family.
In a study on relative efficiency of Indian agriculture
conducted by Lawrence J. Lavand Pan A. Yotopoulos,"the conclusion
resulted in favor of small farms (less than 10 acres).

It

appears that, given the fixed factors of production (land and
fixed capital) and within the ranges of the observed prices of
output and variable inputs (labor), the small farms have higher
104
In the context of analysis, this finding
actual profits."
means "that the small farms attain higher levels of price
efficiency and/or they operate at higher levels of technical
efficiency.

They may imply that in agriculture the supervisory

role of the owner- manager of the farm may be crucial for attaining
high levels of economic efficiency.

This test 1rwuld draw limits
105

of supervisory capacity at 10 acres."
Indian experience with cooperative farming illustrates
several important factors about Indian development and execution :
104

and Pan A. Yotopoulos, A Test for
lication to Indian Agriculture ,
Narch, 197\1) , p. 96.
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American
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(1) it is sensitive to political processes and to social - welfare

considerations.

Economists and planners never appeared to be

very enthusiastic about cooperatives because they recognized the
economic pitfalls .

The enthusiasm of politicans was based on

lIa heavy weighing of social - welfare factors, a misreading of the
economy, and the recognition that cooperative farming was
106
consistent with the current political doctrine."
(2) it
107
illustrates the pragmatism of Indian politics .
The land consolidation program of the becond Plan illustrates
the problems of
India:

executi~~

agricultural development programs in

(1) it has not had political appeal as it is not dramatic;

(2) it must be decentralized in orde r to utilize local knowledge
of land quality and rights;
administrators;
~
108
corruption .

()) it requires a large number of

(4) and it suffered from widespread stories of

Due to t he varied phys ical, economic, and cultural conditions
in India, there is a valid criticism for local modification and
administration of plans .

Much failure in rural development can

be attributed to a lack of a strong local political base from
which knowledge of local conditions and problems can be gained .
The Bahrantray I.ehta Committee in 1957 stressed the need for
greater pO"l'mr and responsibility with the districts and above
109
the village level if rural local government was to be effective.
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A Three - tiered structure has developed - the village panchayat
is elected directly by the village electorate at the lowest
level.

0everal village panchayats are joined to form an

intervillage panchayat samiti whose members are elected indirectly
from village panchayats.

Finally, at the top is the zila

parisdad, and organization at the district level comprised of the
presidents of the panchayat samitis, members of state legislatures
110

and Parliment who represent the district and district officers.
Three important features suggest that rural government is maturing
in India; (1) the clear improvement in quality of locally elected
officals; (2) the beginnings of a tendency to raise local taxes
for local purposes; (3) the gradual growth in recognition of
local power over local developmental affaris.

The continued growth

of local government will lessen concern with ideology as a guide
111

and lead to a more pragmatic approach for decision- making.
The Second Five - Year Plan marked
a distinct departure in favor of
the Feldman - ~lahanobis type of
structural model which emphasizes
the physical aspect of investment
and thus leads, subject to certain
restrictive assumptions about
transformation possibilities domestically
and through foreign trade , to the
proposition that the rising rate of
investment requires increased
domestic manufacturing of capital
goods. 1l2
This is a shift from the Keynesian "flow" analysis "rhich
emphasized the necessity to raise savings (assumed savings could
110
111
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be changed into inve stment) , to a lIstructuralist

ll

vi ew whi ch

emphasized the transformation constraint and the supply of
capital goods to sustain g rowing investment (assumes that the
system would generate savings to finance growing supply of
investment go ods ).

113

The .... ec ond Plan model ..,as greatly influenced by the t,'TO sector gr01"th mode l developed by P . C. I',ahalanobi s and also independently developed by Fe ldman in t he USSR in the 1920 ' s.
Current investment flow 1

is divided into two parts' A
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('k
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, by adding it to C - C , we ge t _
t
0

it
)

Complete the solution for output at time =
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I / Y - the initial investment- income ratio.
o
o
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is the asymptotic rate of growth in the system, where ~

k k

'

k

is the crucial allotment ratio for capital goods production .
a hip:her

f...k

Thus

would al~Tays have a favorable effect on the asymptotic

17roVTth rate for the system, no matter whether it is consumption
or outuut.

Thus , the relative rate of growth in consumption or
115
output is changing over time.
Hhile the assumption underlying the aggregative model was
that the savings rate \'Tas reflected in the behavorial characteris tics of the decision- makinp: units such as the household, the
corporate sector or the government, l.ahalanobis effectively made
it a rigid function of certain "structural" features such as
ca:paci ty of the domestic capital goods industry and capi tal output ratios of the capital goods sector and consumer sector ,

114
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By making the allocation ratio of current investment eoing
into the investment sector the policy variable, he skowed that
a hieher allocation would mean a higher saving rate of growth
116
of output or consumption.
There was much disenchantment and criticism with the Second
Plan .

The second year of th ep lan suffered a sharp drop in

agricultural production.

For the fourth straight year , pro -

duction failed to top the 1953- 54 mark, while demand continued
to increase.

Previous criticism has been based on the assumption

that the basic structures for achieveing agricultural development
were correct and that they only needed refinement.

However , this

new criticism focused on the very foundation of the effort,
117
particularly the Community Deve lopment Program.
The following recommendations came out of the criticism (1) a greater emphasis on agriculture, made tangible by the
requirement that all of the village - level worker ' s time should be
devoted to agricultural development acnivities; (2) an emphasis
placed on inputs of agricultural production, since output was
a function of input; (3) the recognition of complementary relationship among all aspects of the development process and hence, of
the fact that anyone missing element would nullify the influence
The outcome of this recommendation was a
118
package program approach to agricultural development .
of all the others.
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At the end of the Secon:t Plan there was satisfaction that
targets had been met, but that the problems of agriculture had
not been solved.

The Intenisve Agricultural District Program

(the Package Program) was instituted in 1961.
~Tas

The Package Program

conceived as a set of pilot efforts that would demonstrate

VThat could be done to agricultural production by a massive, welldevised , concentrated attack on the agricultural problem.
four major

i~~ovations

Its

included - (1) emphasis on measures for

immediate increase in agricultural production rather than increases
for improving the general context for development or immediate
welfare; (2) it chose for trial those districts most likely to
respond to massive investment in agricultural production; (J)
emphasis was directed toward profitability at farm level.

Farm to

farm variations in profitability were taken into account . (4)
emphasis was on supplying the physical inputs of production, in
principle, it included a wide range of inputs, in practice, it
119
was a fertilizer package.
Unfortunately, the Package Program (1) failed to set up
priorities and "ras excessively diffuse (2) it tended to ignore
the problem of research and evaded institutional and managerial
120

aspects of the ,'later problem.
The poor production record and rapidly rising prices which
characterized the Third Five - Year Plan forced the government 1 s

119
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attention to the price problem and the role of the merchant and
trader in determining prices .

The level of agricultural prices

is crucial to the economic and political life of Inida.

121

There

are four ways of dealing with rising food prices (1) increase
agricultural production, but this not easy to accomplish.

Further-

more, this solution will probably only be effective in the longrun ; (2) a price - depressing mechanism including imports and price
~ould

regulation; this

be unpoplar with the farmers and may cause

them to reduce production;

()) introduce rationing which will

probably be ineffective as a long - run measure;

(4) reduce the

margin between farm and consumer prices eliminating or regulating
the middleman .

The standard response of the Indian government

to the failure of the monsoon and rising prices has been asystem

122
of price controls, rationing and compulsory procurment .

The

basic objective is to provide a minimum ration at normal prices
to the poor in the l arge urban centers .

The problem is how to

procure and distribute the necessary supplies in the face of sharp
budgetary and administrative restrictions .

The usual solution

is compulsory procurement from farmers at prices which are low
for a year of scarcity but more nearly at the level expected in
normal crop years .

There are restriction on movement of grain

between states , however , because of the administrative and

12)
enforcement problems.
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In general, government ventures into actual tradiJ:1-e;
activities has been ineffective except to solve certain problems
associated with extreme stress.

This is due to the efficiency

of the Indian private trading system .
The Fourth Plan contained three features which characterized
the development of agricultural planning during this period: (1)
a considerable gro"l'rth in emphasis in the agricultural sector,
rising in part out of the apparent failure of the agricultural
sector during the Third Plan; (2) major emphasis on inorganic
fertilizer as a key input of agricultural development, together
with a turn towards greater allocations of foreign exchange to
fertilizer imports and an increased interest in foreign collaborations as a quick means of providing capital and technical information
necessary for a rapid expansion of the domestic fertilizer industry;

(3) the recognition of technical requirements of agricultural
development and improvement in research aimed at providing pro 124
fitable innovation to farmers.
A greater emphasis on agriculture can be seen in the decision
for increased fertilizer allocations and improved administrative
and salary structures for agricultural research .

One of the

major criticisms of Indian development is the emphasis on
agriculture which developed at the end of the Third Plan was too
late in coming.

It must be realized that the basic approacr to

Indian agricultural developmental planning h~S been evolutionary .
Predictions of needs have been poor and planners have made the
error of not planning the next step until the last step has

124
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proven insufficient .

This has caused much in loss of time

which is a valuable commodity to the Indian population .

If

broad outlines could have been determined at the beginning,
programs such as the Community Development Program might have
proceeded while groundNork of research and other institutions were
125
being laid for the more effective programs of the future.
The prerequistes for increased use of fertilizers in India
are (1) a greater availability through domestic productions and
imports;

(2) a distribution system to transport the fertilizer to

farmers in the time, place and form desired;

(3) profitable

opportunities for farmers to use the fertilizer.

This last is a

function of (a) research input as it effects the physical production
function,

(b) and extension programs as it effects the efficiency

and skill with which farmers use fertilizer,

(c) the availability

of complementary resources such as water, and (d) a relationship
between crop prices, prices of other inputs associated with
126
increased fertilizer use, and the price of the fertilizer.
Distribution of fertilizer was in the hands of monopolostic
cooperatives which were operated by managements with little
training or incentive to sell fertilizer aggressively.

The

distribution mechanism discouraged overordering much more than
underordering, encouraged late ordering and late arrival and provided
no incentive to sell .
There is also a tendency for agriculturalists to overstate the
extent to which fertilizer has been profitable to Indian farmers .
It is exceedingly important that intensive research be carried
125
126
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on to increase the profitability of fertilizer application in
areas 1-There it is already widely used .

Despi te the position of

rice as the most important food grain in India, the research
situation for rice has been lagging.

At the

be~inning

of the

Fourth Plan, substantial success was had i',ith a short, stiff-stemmed
variety of

Nhe~t

develoned in T.exico that resl)onded to heavy

applications of fertilizer.

"One of the most optomistic signs in

Indian ap:-ricultural development is the clear evidence of an effective
research program in developing plant varieties which transform very
127
large in!lUts of fertilizer into very hio:h yield."
A major
criticism of India ' s agricultural developmental

1)1annin~

has been

that India has an unusally unfavorable fertilizer - to - crop price
relationship, much less favorable in India than in the United

~tates

or Japan.
Because of the variability \'ri thin agriculture, new technolo",y
must be specific to precise conditions of the area 1'There it is used;
a situation ,-thich calls for ..ridespread systems of adaptive and basic
research.

Prior to the last

ye~rs

of the Third Plan, major expend-

iture on agricultural research had made no significant s ontribution
to raising the yields of any of the major food grain crops.

The

problem was that the agricultural effort in India Nas \'lOrkinp: under
the i'Trong assumption - "that India ,,,as looked upon as a poor country
which could not afford fertilizer.

It presumed it necessary to

develop crop varieties ..,hich could provide high yields ay loi', levels
128
of fertility , which was apparently impossible to 8.chieve . "
127
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The Indian agricultural research system had an ample number of
stations but lacked the coordination necessary for success .
The development of a highly productive agriculture in India
requires vast additional supplies of \,later and this \'las realized
during the Fourth Plan .

There was a total lack of knowledge

concerning water management and water resources.

There was little

orljanized for eign assistance emphasis on \'later management problems
in the early years of the Fourth Plan and major studies of water
sources began to be made at the same time.
lI~ducation

is one of the key remaining weaknesses in Indian

agricultural development programming , and in particular, the
129

critical importance of the technically competent extension worker."
The basic error in t'1e Community Development Program and the
extension program lay in placing excessive emphasiS on changing
farmers ' attitudes toward innovation and insufficient emphasis
on the

technolo~y

of

chan~e.

By placing the Community Development

Program back under the hinistry of Agriculture in 1966, this
emnhasis may have been re - established.
In "'.ddi tion to negl"'cting technical competence, the Indian
extension effort has neglested the function of research relating
to communication of innovation and to the social processes involved
1)0
in rapid diffusion of knowledge .
KnoNledp:e of the oatterns of
village leadership, of the processes and patterns of communication,
and of the functions of existing social structures can help speed
the diffusion proc ess.

So far, little research of this type has

been done , instead there has been done , instead there has been a
129
1)0

Ibid., p . 116.
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tendency to transfere knowledge of these processes from the
U~ited ~tates

to India.

During the Fourth Plan more attention Nas turned towards the
question of the over - all level and the seasonal and year - to - year
stability of agricultural prices.

It became more epp8rent that

farmers make their economic decisions with price as the signiificant
variable .

Var ious emperical studies of supply response indicated

that farmers

~ill

change their cropping

patterns according to

131
relative price changes.
Policy regarding the over- all level of agricultlJral prices is
subject to conflicting political and economic pressures.

On the

political side it must be recognized that the bulk of the population
is rural, but thet the urban population carries 60- 70 percent of
the

\~eight

of food in the cost of living for industriak workers

ho constitute a dominant urban influence on the politics of food
prices.

And there is the economic conflict there there is

pressure to encourage

hi~her

prices, but at the same time there is

also the difficult problem of capital formation which requires
that measures which transfere income and savings to'rard agriculture
be minimized.

Rising agricultural prices puts

up\~ard

pressure

on urban wages and not only reduces business profits but also
squeezes public sector funds as well.

Reduced capital formation

in both the public and private sectors is the result.

Finally,

it is not clear whether higher prices w·ould encourage an increase
in total agricultural production .

It is possible that the

incentives of farmers to produce are much more influenced by
ready availability of consumer goods than by modest changes in

131

Ibid, p . 120 .

prices of agricultural commod.i ties .
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132

in fact little can :De done to change
the over- all relationship of agricultural
and nonagricultural prices except through
changes in imports. The over - all price
relationships are largely a product of
relative supply and demand for agricultual
and nonagricultural commodities.
It is possible that a reduction in uncer tainity regarding agricultural prices
achieved by reducing price fluctuations
might bring about increased production
without the unfortunate political and
economic effects of a general rise in
agricultural prices. However, there are
major problems in reducing such fluct1
uutions which still have not been solved . ~3
The use of these four plans as a planning mechanissm has led
to general achievements during this period.

The index number of

agricultural output rose from 100 in 1949 to 139 in 1960- 61,
while the index number for food grains rose to 135 .

As a result, the

per capita new domestiC availability of food grains increased from
13.5 to 16 . 2 ounces per day from 1951 to 1961, a rise of 17 percent.
'l'he total production of nonfood grains rose by 47 percent compared
with 1949- 50, and that is faster than the production of food
134
grains , which rose 35 percent.
T.,uch of the problem of the Indian agricultural situation
lies the general characteristics of the Five - Year plans .

It must

be admitted that, on many counts, these p lans have failed in their
purpose.

This is seen in the need to adandon the Fourth Plan

after two years into that particular plan period.

Why do these

The answer may be that the Indians "are more effective
135
as intellectualizers than as doers."

plans fail?

13~

133
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The dichotomy between ideals and
reality, and even between enA~ted
legislation and implementation,
should be seen against the back~round
that India, like the other ~outh
Asian countries, is a soft state.
There is an unwillingness among the
rulers to impose obligations on the
governed and a corresponding unwill ingness on their part to obey rules
laid down by democratic orocedures. 1 36
Indian planning does not appear to
be an indicator of realisitc goals
or actual accomplishments to be
achieved in production and consumption.
If a person Nere to study the Indian
economy on the basis of its Five Year plans , he would not know whence
the economy came, where it is presently,
and where it is ~oing. Indi~n
planning is misleadin by its suggestion
of orderliness in an economy that
actually operates in a chaotic manner 1 37
Indeed , the Indian agricultrual sector has come a long way
S i n c e independenc e , but its greatest challenge awaits it in the
year s ahead.

The agricultural progress made in the

last few

y ear s has con v inc ed many obse r vers of the p ossibility for India
to f eed her r ap i d l y growi ng p opulation .

This is India ' a central

p roblem a t t he mone nt - to i mpr ove the rati o of food supply to
p op ulation.
while no dramtic decreas e in t he birth rate c an be expected ,
India ' s hope lies in increasing the

a ~ ricultura l

out put .

The

new de velopme ntal scheme enacted in 1969 following t he f a ilure of
the Fourth Plan strieves to increase output.

Ori p: inally c a lled

the Intensive Ag ricultural District Program, it is now called

136
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Gunnar, h yrdal, Asian Drama : An Insuir y Into the Poverty
of Nations, (New York, Pantheon Books, 196), p. 107.
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The "Green Revolution . "
Development

Pro~ram

It contrats sharply 'Ti th the Community

which tended to disperse scarse resources

over all the 500,000 villages, for the district program concentrates
on one distr i ct in each state .

138

This program guarentees to all cultivators in a district the
inputs required to assure increases in output of 50 to 150 percent.
The typical Indian production per acre is so 10N that increases
of this nature are not impossible.

"But such revolutionary

changes require not only intensive preliminary demonstration and
planning and training for each individual farmer, but alsothat
all the components of the package be delivered on time and in the
rio:ht amount.1I

139

The nrinciple elements of the pflc1(a£:;' are 1'later, ne"T hip;hyielding seeds, fertilizer suitable for local soils, pesticides,
labor to meet peak reqUirements, credit at economic interest rates,
fa.rm- to - market road_s, drying and storage facilities, truck and
rail

tr~nsport,

incentive prices and floor prices.

ith 20

million acres of India ' s total cultivated acreage of 372 million
under the high- yielding seeds, success has been retarded by the
unsuitability of the seeds to many of Indian agricultural conditions .
140
This is particularly true of rice, by far the lar~est crop.
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Brookes, R. R. , "Inc1ia J s Central Problem Is hol'! To Imnrove
Ratio of l"ood to population , " ~!ew York 'I'imes , January 19 , 1970 , p . 68.
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If India is to sustain [!;rol'Tth , the follot'!ing are neceaasry (1) at least some p ol itical stability ; (2) a praematic approach
to agricultural r esearch ; (3) an increase in domestic savings;
141

(4) and

outside~help

141

Farming ,
po 12 .

in assuring adequate foreign exchange.

Lelyveld , Joseph , tI ' Green Revolution ' Transforming Indian
But It Has A Long Hay 'ro Go . II New York Times, Hay 28 , 1969,
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